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Introduction 
The transfer of Crimea to Russia in March 2014 – later admitted by president Putin as a planned 
annexation1 - was received in the West with a combination of deep astonishment and fierce 
rejection. Eschewing from a military response, the EU and the US opted for a strategy of 
economic sanctions and political isolation. The first component of this strategy seems to have 
worked fairly well. Sanctions, in combination with plunging oil prices, brought the Russian 
economy on the verge of collapse by the end of 2014. The second objective however, to isolate 
Russia politically, did not materialise. The Western narrative of an isolated Putin proves 
unconvincing. Western media were quick to portray a Putin eating alone during the November 
2014 G20 summit in Australia
2
. Nevertheless, the pictures did not show, that there was in fact a 
person sitting with Putin at the table – namely, Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff (see Reuters 
2014). 
 
The Brazilian-Russian tête-à-tête was not the only indication that isolation of Russia failed. A 
prominent step that aimed for the isolation of Russia was United Nations (UN) resolution 68/262 
that highlighted Ukrainian territorial integrity. This resolution, titled “Territorial integrity of 
Ukraine” was adopted on March 27, 2014. The resolution stresses Ukrainian sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, and calls upon all states to refrain from the disruption or the modification of 
Ukraine’s borders. It also dismisses the validity of the Crimea referendum of March 16, calling 
upon all states and other actors to not recognise the resulting change in the status of Crimea 
(United Nations 2014a). It was adopted with 100 votes in favour, but 58 countries abstained and 
11 voted against (United Nations 2014b, 17).  
 
                                                     
1
BBC, “Putin reveals secrets of Russia's Crimea takeover plot”,  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31796226 (Accessed 
March 13, 2015). This annexation is a rather politicized topic in which this essay does not wish to take position. 
Moreover, it is important to stress that the annexation of the Crimea is only one episode in the Ukraine crisis, which 
initiated in January 2014 and lingers on until the day of writing. This essay does not aim to give an exhaustive 
overview of the conflict in Ukraine, nor of the Crimea crisis. As will be explained in this introduction, this study 
solely aims to analyse the position of Argentina and Brazil regarding the transfer of Crimea to Russia, which was 
legitimised through a referendum incompatible with Ukrainian constitution. 
2 Heather McnNab, “From Vlad to worse,” Daily Mail, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2836488/From-
Vlad-worse-snubbed-airport-sit-dinner-shunted-edge-family-photo-condemned-world-leaders-s-no-wonder-
President-Putin-Russian-leave-G20-summit.html (Accessed December 29, 2014)  
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This resolution offers an interesting case of this isolation policy. The votes against the resolution 
are obviously perceived as support for Russia, to which the resolution is clearly directed. 
Motives for such support are straight-forward; for example, Syria relies heavily on Russian 
support in its civil war. More interesting is the widespread abstention on this resolution, while it 
basically stresses the UN ground rules as formulated in the Charter. Among the 58 countries 
were 14 from Latin America and the Caribbean, which was a heavy blow for the US and its allies. 
Countries such as Brazil and Argentine refused to speak out against Russian aggression, although 
they claim to be a fierce supporter of the liberal international order of sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and non-intervention. It was precisely the refusal of countries like Brazil to reject the 
annexation of Crimea that ran counter to most Western expectations (Stuenkel 2014). 
 
The disenchantment with this position is mostly due to the inability of mainstream international 
relations (IR) theories to explain the Latin American impartiality. From a liberal perspective, one 
could expect those countries that cherish liberal values to utilise multilateral institutions to 
resolve international disputes. From that point of view, the UN resolution provides a logical 
forum to protect national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Moreover, a realist approach does 
not satisfactorily explain this behaviour either. If these states were guided by national interest, 
one would expect them to side with the US and its Western allies. The US is a major economic 
partner and the military hegemon in the Western hemisphere. Although Astrada and Martin 
(2013) stress the increased Russian interest in the region, economic relations with Russia are still 
meagre, and Moscow’s geopolitical clout in the region is limited. 
 
This essay addresses this lacuna. It therefor examines the position of two major Latin American 
countries: Argentina and Brazil. Although these countries differ significantly, they also bare 
major similarities. Both countries are rooted in Western political culture and acclaim liberal 
values of non-intervention and territorial integrity. They are the two greatest political powers of 
South America, where both seek political hegemony. Likewise, they equally refrain from 
criticising Russia on the violation of these norms. Also, both countries are better served by 
currying favour with the US and support the UN resolution. Nonetheless, both countries 
abstained from voting on the UN resolution. 
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This paradox results in the following question: what motives guided Argentina and Brazil in their 
position concerning the Russian annexation of Crimea? To confront this paradox, this essay 
starts off by firstly demonstrating the inability of mainstream IR theories to explain the position 
of these states. Then, it offers a constructivist approach, with a focus on state identity, to address 
the research question. To provide the necessary background on Brazilian and Argentine identity, 
it draws on an extensive literature review. Subsequently, it employs a discourse analysis on the 
statements communicated by the leaders of these countries during the Crimea crisis. The 
argument advanced here is that self-identification of grandeur requires an autonomous foreign 
policy, which proved incompatible with supporting the UN resolution on Crimea. The Crimea 
crisis is not an isolated case: the pursuit of multipolarity, which facilitates autonomy, is a 
constant feature in Argentine and Brazilian foreign policy. 
 
The Ineptitude of Mainstream Theories: Liberalism and Realism 
The case under scrutiny concerns a vote on a UN resolution. The UN’s predecessor, the League 
of Nations, was a point of reference for liberal theorists. After the costly First World War the 
perception emerged that war was irrational (Hollis and Smith 1990, 18). Liberalism as IR theory 
is rooted in the eponymous political ideology, emphasising freedom, equality, free trade and 
constitutionalism (Dunne 2008, 110). In liberalism’s domestic analogy, liberal states aim for the 
extension of their ideas to the international realm. Establishing institutions and the rule of law, as 
Dunne (2008, 110) puts it, liberals strive for “domestication of the international”. 
 
Contemporary liberals like neoliberal institutionalists ceded some optimism about the 
establishment of liberal world order. Especially since the Second World War, liberals embraced 
the assumption that the international system is anarchic – that is, lacking overarching authorities. 
Nonetheless, liberals did not drop the claim that anarchy can (at least partly) be overcome, and 
the end of the Cold War re-launched the liberal expectations conferred on international 
organisations and enforcing international law (Dunne 2008, 110). Along with neorealists, 
neoliberals perceive states as key actors, albeit not the only actors. States are indeed rational – i.e. 
pursuing their interests – but for neoliberals, institutions do facilitate cooperation to the benefit 
of all (Lamy 2008, 132-133). International organisations thus, perform a crucial role in the view 
neoliberal institutionalists (Jackson and Sorenson 2006, 110).  
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Both Argentina and Brazil do in fact espouse a culture of liberalism, continuously stressing their 
adherence to international law. For example, the liberal principles that guide Brazilian foreign 
policy international relations are anchored in the constitution: Brazil adheres to, among other 
things, national independence, non-intervention, equality between states and peaceful resolution 
of conflicts. Thus, if these countries strived for the internationalisation of the liberal values, they 
would actively engage in the defence of these norms. Thus, valuing the international order and 
the prevalence of international law, liberalism would expect them to denounce the Russian 
annexation of Crimea, which is widely regarded as a violation of the UN Charter. 
 
Argentina and Brazil did in fact in previous cases act in accordance with neoliberal 
institutionalist predictions. Argentina never misses the opportunity to use international 
organisations (whether Mercosur
3
, UNASUR
4
, or the UN) as a platform to advance its claims on 
the Falklands (Pinkerton and Benwell 2014, 15-16). One of the Brazilian main foreign policy 
objectives is actually aimed at enhancing its position in an international organisation: its bid for a 
permanent seat in the UN Security Council (Gardini 2012, 15). Likewise, in the Crimea case 
neoliberal institutionalism would expect actors to turn to international institutions to overcome 
anarchy. One would thus expect Argentina and Brazil to seize the opportunity to make use of the 
UN platform do denounce the unilateral change of international borders. Apparently, this is not 
the case here, and liberal theory leaves us without an explanation of the behaviour of Argentina 
and Brazil. 
 
Realists however, are not too surprised that the UN is bypassed in the international stage. From a 
realist point of view, states establish institutions primarily to serve their interest (Lamy 2008, 
134).  However, the question remains what realism would expect these countries to do in this 
very situation. Although contemporary realists moved away from some of its classical 
assumptions - Kenneth Waltz’ (1979) structural realism is perhaps the most prominent example – 
the core assumptions have been maintained. Firstly, realism is state-centric, focussing on the 
state as principle actor of international relations. These states pursue their national interest, 
                                                     
3 Mercosur, or Mercosul in Portuguese (Common Market of the South), is an economic union founded by 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Venezuela joined in 2012. 
4 The South American Union, comprising all sovereign countries on the continent. 
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aimed at survival. More pessimistic about anarchy than liberals, realists think states rely on self-
help in order to secure their survival. Since states are rational, they will attempt to accumulate 
their power in order to safeguard their survival (Dunne and Schmidt 2008, 93).  
 
From a realist perspective, one would argue that the countries under scrutiny would make the 
following calculation. With regard to the UN vote, the favour of two competing major powers – 
the US and Russia - is at stake. Supporting the resolution means supporting the US-led alliance, 
whilst rejecting it implies allying with Russia. Bearing the overall goal of survival in mind, states 
should thus consider which country offers most resources to enhance their power. The US is, 
after Brazil, the second trading partner for Argentina (CIA World Factbook 2014a). For Brazil  
too, the US is the second trade partner; and for both, bilateral trade with Russia is negligible 
(CIA World Factbook 2014b). Moreover, these comparisons only concern the US and Russia; 
adding up trade with the EU, also a major stakeholder in the Crimea crisis and US ally, the 
economic interest calculation between Russia and Western countries becomes even more 
contrasting. Last but not least, Ukraine itself is a strategic partner of Brazil: the two countries are 
engaged in far-reaching space technology cooperation since 2002 (Montserrat 2005; 2010). 
 
Nonetheless, other than economic resources should be taken into account. It is hard to argue 
which geopolitical motives could be at work. Some might argue that impartiality is the way to go 
if one likes to maintain cordial ties with all actors involved. From a realist perspective however, 
this argument does not hold sway: Machiavelli (1992 [1532], 89), spiritual father of realism, 
warned that such a stance will disappoint both antagonists, and weaken the position of the neutral 
actor: 
A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a downright enemy, that 
to say, when, without any reservation, he declares himself in favour of one party 
against the other; which course will always be more advantageous than standing 
neutral […] In either case it will always be more advantageous for you to declare 
yourself and to make war strenuously; because, in the first case, if you do not declare 
yourself, you will invariably fall a prey to the conqueror, to the pleasure and 
satisfaction of him who has been conquered, and you will have no reasons to offer, 
nor anything to protect or to shelter you. 
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If realism demands to come clean, one could argue that the BRICS alignment would then push 
Brazil into supporting Russia, but the geopolitical implications of BRICS membership are 
unclear. Until now, the BRICS lack any military structure that could improve the Brazilian 
power position. More importantly, nor the US, nor the Russian Federation is a military threat to 
these countries. And if they were, putting the cards on the US would be a safer bet, considering 
the superior US Navy. Above all, the Rio Treaty of 1948 provides for collective defence of the 
Americas (Gardini 2012, 93). Thus, since neither economic nor geopolitical gains bolstering the 
countries’ power appear decisive, realism does not satisfactorily explain the behaviour of the 
cases.  
 
A Constructivist Alternative  
The dissatisfaction with realist and liberal perspectives urges for a theoretical alternative. Such 
an alternative can be found in constructivism
5
. At the heart of this approach is the idealist 
position that reality is a social construction. This starkly contrasts with most IR theories, which 
are primarily materialist. This contrast is not surprising, considering that constructivism is 
originally not an IR theory, but a social theory. It rose to the ranks of international relations 
theory when Alexander Wendt (1992, 395) declared that “anarchy is what states make of it”. 
Nonetheless, as a social theory, it does not make substantive claims on the behaviour of actors in 
international arena. Rather, constructivism offers a framework to explain behaviour. What this 
specific behaviour would be then, depends on the ideas, norms and culture that guide the 
particular actor (Barnett 2008, 162).  
 
Consequently, constructivism juxtaposes itself to mainstream IR theories by treating interests as 
dynamic rather than static, and subjective rather than objective. Other than from material factors, 
interests also derive from ideational factors. For example, Wendt (1992, 398) claims that 
“identity is the basis of interests”. One cannot attribute certain interests equally to all actors – 
they might differ from state to state according to their respective particularities. Interests are thus 
                                                     
5 Like there is not one realist or liberal theory, this essay claims to employ a constructive approach rather than the 
constructivist approach. Various constructivists employ various ideational factors to explain behaviour. For example, 
Katzenstein (1996a) focusses on domestic factors whereas Finnemore (1996) highlights international norms in 
explaining IR. For a more extensive overview, see Hurd (2008). 
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formed ‘within’ the state, not purely determined ‘outside’ the state. Instead of exogenous and 
given, interests endogenous and socially constructed (Price and Reus-Smit 1998, 267; Ruggie 
1998, 864; Wendt 1992, 392-394).  
 
Constructivists like Wendt (1992, 397) highlight that identity- –“relatively stable, role-specific 
understandings and expectations about self” - is fundamental in shaping those interests. For 
example, although Argentina and Chile have somewhat of a similar position in the world, 
diverging identities produce diverging interests. Departing from the notion that interests are 
exogenous and given, constructivists to explore factors like identity to identify endogenous 
interest that guide actors. As will be elaborated in the following chapters, Brazil and Argentina 
cherish an identity of a great nation. This self-identification calls for autonomist foreign policies 
which to express this greatness. Consequently, as we see in the case of the Crimea crisis, these 
identity-based policies often run counter to the expectations derived from mainstream IR theories.  
 
The stress on factors like identity leads some to the mistaken perception that constructivism, 
unlike its mainstream counterparts, is non-rational. Such an assumption results from conflating 
rationality with the pursuit of material interest, and denies the rationality behind the pursuit of 
ideational interests. Constructivism in fact is rooted in, inter alia, the ideas of Max Weber 
(Jackson and Sorensen 2006, 164; Ruggie 1998, 869-861). Sociologist scholar and Weber expert 
Stephan Kalberg (1980), distils the Weberian notion of rationality from Weber’s classics 
Economy and Society (1968 [1921]) and Gesammelte Aufsaetze zur Religionssoziologie (1972 
[1920]). Kalberg (1980) signals four types of rationality which are based on various types of 
social action. For example, formal rationality is based on means-end rational type of social action 
(zweckrational), whereas substantive rationality is rather value-rational, or wertrational
6
. 
Whereas the former type of social action is, according to Kalberg (1980, 1151-11) aimed at 
“purely pragmatic and egoistic interests”, the latter is steered by a “value postulate” – originating 
in for example friendship, socialism or Calvinism (Kalberg 1980, 1155). In value-rational action, 
the pursuit of a specific value prevails above the mere consequences (Hollis and Smith 1990, 77). 
                                                     
6 Formal rationality is also means-end rational, but constitutes a bureaucratic application of rules, laws (Kalberg 
1980, 1158). Kalberg (1980, 1149) considers the fourth type of rationality, hypothetical rationality, neither means-
end rational nor value-rational. Weber’s writings are prone to many explanations. Etzioni (1988) for example, 
provides a similar, but different, interpretation of Weber’s rationality. 
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From this distinction of types of rationality emerge the zweckrational approaches of neorealism 
and, to a lesser extent, neoliberalism on the one hand, and the more wertrational constructivism 
on the other
7
. Again, the Weberian notion of value-rational behaviour does not imply non-
rationality; rather, it is another type of rationality. Such values in Weberian sense are similar to 
the ideational factors constructivists contribute to interest formation – values, but also norms, 
culture and identity (see Katzenstein 1996a). As Wendt (1992, 398) himself recognised, 
constructivism does not deny actors pursue their interests; rather, they are based on identities. 
 
Nonetheless, constructivism distinguishes itself from mainstream IR theories on other aspects 
than the perception of rationality. As mentioned, constructivism is primarily concerned with 
ideas. However, the constructivist focus on ideas does not deny the existence of material forces; 
rather, it perceives material forces through the lens of social concepts (Hurd 2008, 301). Or, as  
Wendt (1995, 73) puts it, “material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the 
structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded”. Also, they tend to be somewhat 
reluctant about the overtly positivist approach that neorealists and neoliberals – whether or not 
explicitly – espouse. Instead, constructivists claim to come to plausible logical and empirical 
interpretations. In this manner, they prefer small-t truth claims over Big-T truth claims (Price and 
Reus Smit 1998, 272). This stance is compatible, Adler (1997, 326) argues, with the Weberian 
notion of Verstehen (to understand), which aims to explain social action in the light of its 
meaning, advocating that “action must always be considered from within” (Hollis and Smith 
1990, 72). This does not put constructivism in diametrically opposed position to traditional 
positivism; rather, it stresses the epistemological limits inherent to social science. 
 
Nonetheless, for its criticism of materialism, positivism and the mainstream IR notion of 
rationality, constructivism is often identified with idealist, anti-positivist critical theories such as 
postmodernism, poststructuralism, and feminism.
 
But the constructivist appeal on interpretation 
does relegate it to the realm of interpretivism and anti-positivism; as De Zwart (2002), signals, it 
is a mistake to deduce relativism form the practice of interpretation. Discourse analysis consists 
of interpretation, which is not to be equalled to “cognitive relativism” (De Zwart 2002, 495).  For 
                                                     
7 Although institutions are means for neoliberals, one could argue that there is also a value-rational aspect in this 
theory: liberal values equally produce value postulates. The contrast with regard to types of rationality is thus 
sharper between constructivism and realism than with liberalism.  
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its nuanced position, constructivism has been accused from the alternative field of masked 
rationalism and materialism (Price and Reus-Smit 1998, 260). Critical theorists disqualify neutral 
theorizing as impossible, as generalisations cannot be disconnected from power structures
8
 (Price 
and Reus-Smit 1998, 268). Not surprisingly, Adler (1997) and Smith and Owens (2008, 178), 
conclude that constructivism holds somewhat of the middle between mainstream IR scholars and 
relativist and interpretative theorists, effectively bridging both theoretical and methodological 
ends.
9
 Constructivists shun from both overt mainstream IR positivism and nihilist critical theory 
anti-positivism.  
 
Constructivism’s emergence led mainstream theorists to incorporate social aspects like ideas into 
realism or liberalism. Nonetheless, such studies as performed by Goldstein and Keohane (1993, 9) 
usually resort to mainstream positivism, concluding that one can say “relatively little about the 
impact of broad world views on politics.” They defect, in Ruggie’s (1998, 7866) words, in the 
face of “the pull of neo-utilitarian precepts”. Likewise, neorealists like Krasner (1993) depicts 
ideas as mere reflections of the material world that serve, in Adler’s (1997, 324) words, to 
“justify material causes”. Neoliberals like Fukuyama (1989) too adapted to the post-Cold War 
order, paying more attention to ideas in international politics. Nonetheless, this focus is generally 
on liberal ideas, whereas constructivists focus on ideas in general (Jackson and Sorensen 2006, 
163). Mainstream theorists thus, albeit accepting reluctantly the role of ideas, differ from 
constructivists for their materialism (realists) or the restriction of the scope of ideas to merely 
liberal ideas (liberals). 
 
This essay employs a constructivist approach. It does not neglect material forces, but focusses on 
the role of ideas (Adler 1997, 323). Also, it acknowledges that actors are rational, albeit 
perceiving rationality not merely as means-end driven, but integrating value-rational behaviour 
as well. The interests actors pursue are thus not considered exogenous and given, but endogenous 
and socially constructed. Thereto, it embraces Wendts’ (1992, 398) assumption that interests are 
                                                     
8 The sole sentence does not treat alternative approaches with due respect. However, the aim here is not to give a 
complete theoretical tour d’horizon; the objective here is put constructivism in its academic context. Adler (1997), 
Price and Reus-Smit (1998) and Smith and Owens (2008) perform the former task.  
9  This essay does not claim, nor does it aim, to give an exhaustive overview of the distinctions between 
constructivism, rationalist and interpretive theories. For constructivism with regard to structure-agency and other 
dichotomies, see Adler (1997).  
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identity-based. Thus, in explaining political behaviour, and the interests that underlie it, this 
essay explores the identity of the actors under scrutiny.  
 
Methodology: a Discourse Analysis 
To address the research question, the focus will be on the identities of cases of study. State 
identities are thus considered the independent variable of this study, whereas the stance in the 
Crimea crisis constitutes the dependent variable. This is not to say that identities are considered 
fixed or absolute entities. Nor does it disregard the existence of multiple, competing identities. 
Rather, it implies that identity – despite its multifaceted nature - is considered the variable that 
affects the dependent variable. Moreover, it is important to stress that state identity is basically a 
reification; it is the representatives of the states - its politicians and officials - who are endowed 
with a certain identity. Although the state (or, more specifically, its behaviour) is the unit of 
analysis, its presumed identity is merely the identity of the collective of its representatives. In 
sum, when speaking of Brazilian or Argentinian identity, one ought to bear in mind that there is 
no such thing as the identity, and that state identity is a reification. Nonetheless, by analysing the 
behaviour of states we can perceive the underlying identities shaping this behaviour, which is 
eventually carried out by ‘the state’. Thus, by unpacking identities that are dominant within 
foreign policy formation, we can deduct certain patterns that provide the context for the analysis 
of foreign policy. To sketch the context that is crucial to Verstehen, a literature review of 
Argentine and Brazilian political identity is provided as a starting point of the study.  
 
For this study, this means that the research question should be approached with a method that 
allows for the interpretation of the relation between identity, interest and behaviour. Hereto, a 
discourse analysis will be employed. Although rooted in linguistics, discourse analysis has 
progressively expanded its research area, extending its focus from the syntactic to the content 
level (see Gee 2014). As a result, discourse analysis, as Barnett (2008, 166-67) states, has been a 
central asset in the constructivist research agenda, partly because it shares the constructivist 
commitment to socially constructed nature of the world (Milliken 1999, 229). Moreover, 
discourse analysis is one of the most straight-forward methods to apply Verstehen to IR, a 
discipline where classic fieldwork is often beyond reach. It is therefore not surprising that, 
parallel to the ascendance of constructivism in IR, discourse analysis has risen in recent years in 
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this very same field (see, for example, Carta and Morin 2014; Epstein 2008; Holzscheiter 2014; 
Makarychev 2014; Schoenberger-Orgad 2011; Teti 2012; Yongtao 2010). 
 
To employ a discourse analysis, a wide range of data is available: speeches, declarations and 
interviews issued by the governments under study. In the course of the Crimea crisis, both 
governments issued a number of statements that communicate their stance on the issue. These 
discourse are carried out by representatives of the governments: presidents, (foreign) ministers, 
and UN ambassadors. These data are available on the official websites of the presidency, 
government or foreign office. Since these statements are official and deliberately issued by the 
Argentine and Brazilian administrations, they constitute the primary data that will be analysed. 
Their primacy is derived from the fact that the administrations choose to communicate their 
stances, and are thus officially part of their foreign policy. To a lesser extent, data will be drawn 
from statements and interviews as published in newspapers. Subsequently, these data are 
secondary since the media, and not the governments themselves, choose to publish them. These 
data thus constitute a sort of officious foreign policy. 
 
The period of the collected data starts at the outset of the Ukrainian crisis to the aftermath of the 
UN vote. On February 18, the political crisis in Ukraine – unchained when Yanukovych 
announced to withdraw from the EU association agreement –  escalated into riots. This moment 
is a logical moment because the crisis became so tense that it became impossible to refrain from 
comments. March 27 is the date of the vote on UN resolution 68/262 on the integrity of Ukraine, 
but the discussion lingered on in the aftermath, the weeks and months following the vote. This 
aftermath is set to end on July 17, de date of the downing of flight MH17, which formed a new 
critical juncture. This incident hardened the position of the West against Russia, and created a 
new dynamic within the conflict, and is therefore perceived to be ending the aftermath of the 
Crimea referendum. These statements offer abundant information on how these governments 
perceive the developments in Ukraine and provides insights about how identity shapes their 
interests. Here, the empathic nature of Verstehen reappears: the notion that action should be 
understood from within.  
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The analysis is two-fold: first, the more general nature of Argentine and Brazilian identity is 
examined trough a literature review. This review shows how the identification of grandeur in 
both cases urges them to pursue an autonomous foreign policy. The second part of this analysis 
will consist of an discourse analysis to understand the position of these countries in the specific 
case of the Crimea crisis. This analysis shows the resistance of these countries to follow a bipolar 
logic in the conflict, which compromises their search for autonomy, which in turn, as is the 
argument, is rooted in identity. 
 
Brazilian Identity in Foreign Policy  
Brazil clearly illustrates the axiom that identity shapes foreign policy. Since the establishment of 
the Brazilian Republic, foreign policy reflected Brazil’s ambivalence regarding its identity. The 
question at heart of this ambivalence is whether Brazil is a Western, First World country or a 
non-Western, Third World country
10
. Oliver Stuenkel (2011) extensively researched Brazilian 
self-identification, concluding that Brazilians’ identifications vary from “Western” to “partly 
Western” to “non-Western”. According to Stuenkel (2011, 179), its relations with the West is 
crucial in understanding Brazil’s identity. In this complex relationship, two opposed tendencies 
are at work. At the one hand, Brazil tends to criticise and distance itself from the West. On the 
other hand, Brazil tries to emulate the West (Stuenkel 2011, 180). Brazil’s relationship with the 
West, Stuenkel’s (2011, 189) finds, has been marked by a “mixture of attraction and aversion”.  
 
This love-hate relationship with the West in general and the US in particular marks the two 
different currents that shaped Brazilian foreign policy. The non-Western, Third World current is 
more nationalist and developmentalist and stresses the intertwined principles of autonomy and 
universalism. Autonomy facilitates universalism, which is defined as  “the willingness to 
maintain relations with all countries, regardless of location, regime type, economic concerns, as 
well as independence from global powers” (Gomes Saraiva 2011, 53). This position is rooted in 
the Brazilian conviction of their destiny as a world power, instead of just another Western 
country. Brazil is meant to flourish, at equal footage with the US in the hemisphere. Illustrative 
is the continuous objective to obtain a permanent seat in the UNSC, which has been pursued 
                                                     
10 In 2015 the term Third World is indeed somewhat of an anachronism; it was adequate throughout most of the 20th 
century however to describe what is now considered the Global South. 
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since the times of the League of Nations and subsequently since the establishment of the UN. As 
a former foreign minister put it: “no country can escape its destiny and, for good or ill, Brazil is 
condemned to grandeur (Gomes Saraiva 2011, 55). This grandeur urges Brazil to follow an 
autonomous courses which confirms the status the country envisages for itself. 
 
As said, multiple identities can coexist. In the Brazilian case, the self-identification of a First 
World country leads to a different policy prescription. The course favoured by this more 
Western-oriented current is defined as pragmatic institutionalist. This minority current counters 
the autonomist current by claiming that autonomy is precisely obtained through integration 
within the liberal institutional framework (Vistentini 2014, 62). This current was dominant in the 
1990s when Brazil sought global insertion through the adhesion to international regimes, such as 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Instead of universalism and its tolerance of ‘alternative’ 
forms is government, this current advocates a more vocal support for democracy and human 
rights, and envisages a liberal order based on “shared sovereignty” (Gomes Saraiva 2011, 57). 
These two mentalities, rooted in either aversion or attraction of the West, have shaped Brazilian 
foreign policy.  
 
In these relations, the stance towards the US is a point of reference. The institutionalists support 
full alignment with the hemispheric hegemon, whereas the universalists call to diversify 
Brazilian foreign policy. Over the last decades, Brazil alternated several times between these two 
positions. In the early 1950s, Brazil’s strong identification with Western values and 
anticommunism was coupled with full alignment with the US. From the Kubitschek 
administration (1956-1960) onwards, Brazil searched for more autonomy and broadened its 
political alliances. Under the so-called Independent Foreign Policy, Brazil re-established 
relations with the Soviet-Union, deepened economic ties with China, and resisted the US Cuba 
policy (Hirst 2006, 6-7; Moniz Bandeira 2006, 15-16). Even conservative president Quadros 
decorated Che Guevara with the prestigious Cruzeiro do Sul Order, as to show off Brazil’s 
independent foreign policy (Fausto 1999, 262). The military coup of 1964 brought alignment 
with Washington back to centre stage, and in the decades to come the pendulum swung every 
now and then from one end to another (Fausto 199, 285; Hirst 2006 7-11; Moniz Bandeira 2006, 
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16-21). The centrality of US relations in Brazilian foreign policy leads Pecequilo (2010, 136) to 
distinguishes between “Americanists” and “non-americanists”. 
 
Since the Lula governments (2003-2010), Brazil’s renewed confidence resulted in a more 
assertive foreign policy (Visentini 2014, 66). First of all, by joining the BRICS, which finally 
elevated the country to its long desired status as a global player. Moreover, Brazil increasingly 
presents itself as a leader of the South, expanding relations in other continents, primarily in 
Africa. In general, Brazil broadened its political alliances, which echoes the universalist tradition 
(Visentini 2014). In the post-Cold War era, universalism has been rebranded as the endeavour for 
multipolarity
11
. Celso Amorim, Lula’s foreign minister, voiced Brazil’s desire to “increase, if 
only by a margin, the degree of multipolarity in the world” (Hurrell 2008, cited in Stuenkel 2011, 
180). Brazilian officials showcase national identity “precisely through their unwillingness to 
position themselves either as fully integrated or completely detached from the Western World 
Order” (Stuenkel 2011, 180).  Autonomy is thus the interest derived from identity, and figures as 
a prominent objective of foreign policy. 
 
Argentine Identity in Foreign Policy 
Argentina’s political identity is quite puzzling. The country brands itself as a Western and 
Christian nation (Sánchez and Zapata 2014, 103). But, whereas Argentina has always strongly 
identified with Europe,  the same cannot be said with regard to the US (Escudé 1997; Malamud 
2001, 90). Relations with the US were, as Escudé (1997, 1) signals, “less than friendly and […] 
usually rather tense”. This complicated relationship stems from, inter alia, Argentina’s neutrality 
in both World Wars, its refusal to sign international regimes and its close ties with ‘rogue states’ 
as Iraq and Libya. The ‘carnal relations’ President Carlos Menem (1989-1999) maintained with 
the US formed the exception that proves the rule. After Menem, Argentina left the full alignment 
behind and returned to the traditional autonomist foreign policy (Russell and Takotlian 2015, 
136). 
 
                                                     
11 This essay uses both the terms multipolarity and multipolarism, with a simple but important distinction. 
Multipolarity is the status describing a multipolar world; multipolarism is a position favouring such a world. 
Multilateralism, in turn, is the practice of multipolarity. 
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The strained relations with the hemispheric hegemon marked Argentine foreign policy. Anti-
Americanism is not a sentiment restricted to the ruling elites: a majority of Argentines has a 
negative opinion of the US. These attitudes are exceptional in the region: in Venezuela, where 
US bashing has become almost a national sport, less than 15 per cent of the population holds a 
negative opinion on the US. Only Middle Eastern countries and Pakistan show similar figures 
(Chiozza 2007, 96). This national sentiment manifested itself during the Summit of the Americas 
in Argentina in 2005, where president Bush was received with mass protests (Keohane and 
Katzenstein 2007, 276).   
 
Nonetheless, anti-Americanism is an artefact, rather than the essence, of Argentine identity. 
Many observers conclude that Argentina suffers from chronic overconfidence and self-
importance, based on Argentina’s foregone heydays (Malamud 2011, 100). Argentina was one 
the biggest economies until World War II, but never adjusted its political ambitions to its new 
place in the world order (Escudé 1997, 1-2). Accordingly, Argentina still aspires  to be the 
regional hegemon (Eyre and Suchman 1996, 98). A striking illustration is Argentina’s consistent 
opposition to the Brazilian candidacy to a permanent seat in the UN Security Council (UNSC), 
believing itself to be the rightful Latin American candidate (Malamud 2011, 93). It is perhaps 
this eagerness for a Platz an der Sonne that mostly determines Argentine identity and, 
consequently, its stance vis-à-vis the US, which it has vainly challenged for hemispheric 
hegemony (Escudé 1997, 3).  
 
This drive for grandeur – “a self-importance rooted in a glorious past rather than any promising 
future”, Malamud (2011, 100) sneers - has been coupled with a particular obsession with 
autonomy, which is practised precisely be the kind of policies that riled the US  (Escudé 1997, 
122-123). Poor relations were thus effect, rather than the cause, of Argentina’s autonomous 
foreign policy. In Peronism, the dominant political ideology in Argentina since World War II, 
this stance is particularly present: during the Cold War, Perón claimed a “Third Position” aimed 
to transcend ideological bipolarity, espousing both anti-imperialism and anticommunism 
(Sánchez and Zapata 2014, 103). This is not to say that Argentine autonomism was unique; it 
was of course the cornerstone of the Non-Aligned Movement, of which Argentina was  a 
prominent member. Autonomism cum overconfidence however endowed Argentina with what 
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Escudé (1997, 1) called a unique record in Latin America. Argentine identity is, like the 
Brazilian, based on grandeur. In both cases, this identity is demonstrated by an autonomous 
foreign policy. To put it more bluntly, these countries consider themselves too important to 
follow world powers, and pursue an autonomous course to showcase this importance. 
 
Brazilian Discourses on the Crimea Crisis 
This section applies the constructivist approach to the discourse analysis. First the Brazilian, and 
then the Argentine discourses are analysed to understand their surprising positions on Ukrainian 
question. Brazil has been very careful in speaking out from the very beginning of the crisis. 
When riots broke out in Kiev, the foreign ministry declared to follow disquietly “the 
deterioration of the political and institutional framework in Ukraine, and [Brazil] laments 
profoundly the deaths occurred in Kiev”. It called upon to all parties involved to dialogue, 
stressing that “the political crisis in Ukraine needs to be solved by the Ukrainians themselves, in 
pacific manner with respect for institutions and human rights” (Minstério de Relações Exteriores 
2014a, translation MNS).  
 
Thereafter, Brazil remained silent during the Russian invasion of Crimea and the referendum of 
March 16, a position which was criticised by the Ukrainian embassy in Brazil (Embaixado da 
Ucrânia no Brasil 2014). When the UN resolution was put forward on March 27, UN ambassador 
Patriota initiated his voting statement by stressing the important relationship with Ukraine. “Our 
concern reflects our close bilateral ties with Ukraine, which in 2009 were elevated to the level of 
a strategic partnership. Together Brazil and Ukraine are developing high-technology projects, 
including in the field of space technology. Brazil is also proud to be host to one of the largest 
communities of people of Ukrainian descent outside Europe” (United Nations 2014a, 7). One 
might expect that Patriota would advance by announcing a vote in favour of the resolution, 
especially when he continued as follows: “Brazil has consistently upheld that the Charter of the 
United Nations must be respected under all circumstances. That position reflects our unflinching 
defence of an international system based on cooperative multilateralism and respect for 
international law” (ibid.). Nonetheless, Brazil concludes that “[i]n this situation, it is of the 
utmost importance that all stakeholders exercise maximum restraint” (ibid.).  
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This neutral position was criticised within Brazil, both in parliament and in the media. Faced 
with these critiques, then foreign minister Figueiredo put the government’s position in 
perspective: “We voted like all of Mercosul and the BRICS, expect for Russia, which voted 
against. We cannot turn back to a Cold War logic, of sanctions against sanctions. We need to 
resolve this through dialogue”12 (translation MNS). One week ahead of the vote, Figueiredo 
visited his German counterpart Steinmeier, and announced the Brazilian position: “I agree with 
Steinmeier when he said that we need to overcome the logic of the Cold War, that we had a zero 
sum game and a growing spiral of measures. We see a growing spiral of sanctions and 
countersanctions” 13 (translation MNS). Later, at the BRICS summit in July, president Rousseff 
reiterated the Brazilian aversion against Western sanctions: “We [the BRICS] agree that, in these 
and other cases, the constructive and cohesive involvement of the international community is 
essential, refraining from unilateral actions, which serve the convenience of specific countries, 
but compromise negotiated solutions and the interests of the great majority” (Ministério de 
Relações Exteriores 2014b, translation MNS).  
 
When analysing the Brazilian statements on Ukraine, one interesting observation regards the 
discrepancy between the adherence to international law on the one hand, and the lack of criticism 
of Russian intervention on the other. If one adds up the special relationship with Ukraine, one 
might expect Brazil to speak out in defence of its strategic partner. But Brazil seems to be 
bothered by the way this conflict is portrayed, which apparently does not constitute ‘co-operative 
multilateralism’. Accordingly, Brazil does not want to be forced to pick sides. It is likely the 
country does not agree per se with Russian annexation, but uneasy with the bipolar setting, 
Brazil simply does not want to join the West in a one-sided condemnation of Russian 
involvement. The Brazilian government does not believe that unilateral sanctions are in any way 
conducive to a sustainable solution. 
 
                                                     
12 Marina Gonҫalves, “Figueiredo rejeita críticas sobre posição do Brasil em relação à Ucrânia,” O Globo  
http://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/figueiredo-rejeita-criticas-sobre-posicao-do-brasil-em-relacao-ucrania-12016705 
(Accessed May 16, 2015) 
 
13 Fernando Caulyt, “Em Berlim, Figueiredo reforça neutralidade brasileira sobre Crimeia,” Deutsche Welle 
http://www.dw.de/em-berlim-figueiredo-refor%C3%A7a-neutralidade-brasileira-sobre-crimeia/a-17513404 
(Accessed May 16, 2015) 
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Moreover, bearing Brazilian identity in mind, the unwillingness to come clean runs deeper.  
Brazil  repeatedly rejected the return to a Cold War logic. Brazil is opposed to a bipolar logic 
because this would necessarily reduce the country to an a subordinated ally of one of the great 
powers. Brazil instead prefers a multipolar order that is more compatible with its self-
identification of an autonomous country. Brazil does not want to be forced to pick sides, it seeks 
to follow an autonomous course that transcends the bipolar logic that dominated the Cold War 
and now seems to be defining the conflict in Ukraine. The discourses of the Brazilian 
government echo the tradition of autonomy and universalism, which in turn induce Brazil to 
maintain a neutral position and abstain from choosing sides in the Crimea conflict. 
 
Argentine Discourses on the Crimea Crisis 
Argentina has been more outspoken than Brazil with regard to Crimea. Moreover, whereas 
Brazilian president Rousseff mostly delegated the matter to her foreign minister, Argentine 
president Kirchner was very vocal herself on the issue. Two weeks before the vote, Kirchner 
visited her French par Hollande and commented in a press conference: 
It is true what mister president [Hollande] signals with respect to territorial 
integrity, but we also call upon the great powers that when we speak of 
territorial integrity it is applicable to all. Because my country suffers from 
territorial encroachment, by the United Kingdom, of the Malvinas [Falklands] 
islands, and nonetheless, the great powers, fundamentally the United Kingdom 
and the United States, have pronounced themselves in favour of the referendum 
that the Kelpers [Falklanders] hold few days ago and which lacks any validity, 
because well, if the Crimea referendum lacks validity, at few kilometres from 
Russia, then a overseas colony at over 13.000 kilometres can have much less 
validity. Something that is fundamental to preserve the peace in the world, 
something that is fundamental for the respect for international law is not to 
have a double standard in the hour of taking decisions.[…] Therefore, we 
support the territorial integrity, therefore we voted how we voted in the 
Security Council, but we demand also that all are coherent and do the exact 
same thing (Casa Rosada 2014a, translation MNS). 
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President Kirchner is crystal clear in her comments. Firstly, she accuses the West of hypocrisy, 
although one could argue this is instrumental to advance her Falklands agenda. Argentina never 
misses a chance to reiterate its claims on the islands, and has found again an occasion to re-
vindicate its claim. But whether or not one considers her criticism sincere or justified, there is 
more in her speech. Kirchner also refers to the vote in the UNSC of March 15, which called upon 
Crimea to not hold the referendum (United Nations Security Council 2014). Although it was 
vetoed by Russia, Argentina had voted in favour. Now, Kirchner accuses some countries – the 
West - of lack of coherence, since they imposed sanctions on Russia on March 17, despite the 
passage of the UNSC that called to “refrain from unilateral actions” (ibid., 1). Kirchner was 
apparently that disturbed, that she instructed her UN ambassador to abstain in the General 
Assembly on March 27. UN Ambassador Perceval repeated Kirchner’s criticism and added:  
Argentina does not believe in adopting a confrontational stance that is a 
throwback to previous eras in which the international community was divided 
into separate and opposed blocs, thus preventing them from building a common 
future. We intend for our decisions not to fall back into the concept of a world 
divided by ideological barriers, a world where the principal victims were the 
peoples of Latin America, Africa and Asia. We believe that those situations 
cannot be resolved through unilateral acts of any kind, especially by actors with 
great influence who should, in fact, be relying on constructive diplomacy.[…] 
Accordingly, we reject initiatives that seek to isolate one of the parties or impose 
unilateral economic sanctions that undermine the conditions that could lead to a 
dialogue that has become very urgent (United Nations 2014b, 20). 
 
Considering Perceval’s speech, Argentina’s opposition to sanctions (the confrontational stance) 
is rooted in the resistance to a return to a Cold War logic. Few days later, cabinet chief 
Capitanich recalled the diverging votes of Argentina in the UNSC and the General Assembly and 
elaborated on Argentina’s stance:  
The former resolution reaffirmed the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
independence of Ukraine, but weeks later there was a very similar text introduced 
in the General Assembly, but the context had substantially changed. Various 
international actors made declarations, formulated threats, signed political and 
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commercial treaties, decreed unilateral economic sanctions, intervening in internal 
affairs of Ukraine.[…] The latter proposed resolution project in the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on March 27 did not seek a message to end the 
escalation of violence. There existed a biased reading of the conflict, pretending a 
revitalisation of a division of the international community based precisely on 
influence blocks, which is precisely the characterization of alignments typical of 
the Cold War (Casa Rosada 2014b, translation MNS). 
 
Argentina thus firmly opposes sanctions and other forms of interference that had place between 
March 15 and March 27, leading Argentina to switch to abstention. Argentina clearly states to 
agree with the text of the resolutions, but abstained in the last one because of disrupting 
behaviour of some states – probably the West. Moreover, in this manner, Argentina felt that a 
Cold War-like bipolar dynamic was created, which triggered Argentina into taking a position of 
neutrality. In this sense, Argentina’s autonomist tradition of non-alignment appears to the 
forefront. Argentina’s tendency to showcase its autonomy is reflected in another governmental 
statement. The Casa Rosada, the governmental palace, communicated that president Putin had 
called his Argentine counterpart to thank her for her position:  
The president of the Russian Federation called the head of state, Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner, today to express the importance of the Argentine 
position to be included in the debate on the question of Crimea, the double 
standard of various countries in relation to the principles of the UN (Casa 
Rosada 2014c, translation MNS). 
The message seems to be that Argentina is not willing to go along with the isolation of Putin, and 
the subsequent bipolarisation of this conflict, as demonstrated by the high-level contacts. The 
initial support for the UNSC resolution is illustrative: it was willing to speak out in favour of 
Ukranian integrity until the conflict was ‘bipolarised’, which was considered a threat to 
Argentine autonomy. 
 
Four weeks later, Kirchner confirmed her vision of a multipolar world, as opposed to bipolar one: 
“it is necessary to look at all parts of the world, we have a multipolar world, there are many more 
protagonists than when the Berlin Wall fell, when some believed it was the end of history” (Casa 
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Rosada 2014d, translation MNS). She continued by stressing the necessity to “not create the 
binary logic of friend and foe, which tensed the history and was tragic in our continent” (ibid.). 
The advocacy of multipolarity is apparently fuelled by the fear of the return to the Cold War, 
which condemned Latin America to the whims of the US and the Soviet Union. Argentina is 
determined to avoid such a logic, which would compromise their ability to pursue an 
autonomous foreign policy.  
 
In sum, apart from the continuous references to the Malvinas, Argentina has stressed its rejection 
of sanctions and other forms of interference and opposed the bipolar logic that reminds of the 
Cold War. Argentina is not willing to follow this logic and, like Brazil, wishes to transcend this 
bipolar logic. Although the style is fairly different, Argentina and Brazil essentially advance the 
same arguments which are primarily rooted in anti-bipolarism and consequently, a desire for 
autonomy in foreign policy. This might contravene Machiavellian rationality to accumulate 
power trough powerful friends. Nonetheless, it is in line with wertrational pursuit of interests – 
in casu autonomy – based on identity.  
 
A discourse analysis of both Argentina and Brazil’s statements on the Crimea crisis offers an 
alternative understanding of their foreign policies. This analysis attempted to show how national 
identity shapes foreign policy: self-perception of greatness needs to be coupled with an 
autonomous foreign policy, which leads Argentina and Brazil to rally against the tendency to 
create a bipolar logic which would relegate them again to the periphery of world politics. Neither 
Argentina or Brazil wished to abide with this logic and chose to abstain in the vote on the UN 
resolution. Not out of disagreement with the text, but with the context, which breathed an air of 
bipolar antagonism which, they seemed to fear, would compromise their autonomy.  
 
This is not to say that anti-bipolarism is the only reason for Argentina and Brazil to abstain. 
Occasional factors are always at work: at the time of the vote, accusations of the NSA spying on 
president Rousseff severely strained bilateral relations, limiting the scope for Rousseff to back an 
US-led project (Stuenkel 2014, 2). Moreover, the sentiment that the West employs double 
standards, probably fostered the Argentine decision not to back the resolution. Many other 
arguments can be advanced - nonetheless, giving a complete and exhaustive understanding of all 
23 
 
the factors has never been the objective of this study. Rather, it investigated the motives  emerges 
from Argentine and Brazilian discourses, which was the aversion against the bipolar frame in 
which the Crimea conflict was portrayed. 
 
The Quest for Multipolarity 
The rejection of the bipolar nature of the Crimean crisis is not limited to the specific case. Anti-
bipolarism, like anti-unipolarism, is part of broad church of multipolarism - a frequent topic in 
the foreign policies of both Brasília and Buenos Aires. As for Argentina, President Kirchner has 
championed multipolarism throughout her presidency. In 2008, she asserted when she met with 
Russian president Medvedev: “We need to deepen our political articulation because we are both 
convinced of the necessity of more multipolarity” (Casa Rosada 2008). In the context of the 
Honduran coup in 2009, Kirchner declared: “A multilateral, multipolar, plural world, respectful 
of the rights of all nations and peoples. I feel that we are today fulfilling that mandate” [..] (ibid. 
2009a, translation MNS).  One year later, Kirchner said in an interview: “It seems to me that we 
are before an totally different historic moment at global scale, with new protagonists, with an 
scenery in which the multipolarity of which has been said so much becomes to obtain a much 
more concrete and less abstract shape” (ibid; 2010a, translation MNS). 
 
In a similar fashion, then economy minister and the current vice-president Amado Boudou stated: 
  […] a multipolar morphology […] is an opportunity for the international 
community to face with distinct means a juncture that is not going to convert in 
bipolarity, in which the rest of the countries need to ally with one or the other, 
and this must converge towards a multipolarity where all actors are part of a new 
equilibrium, in which all countries have the possibility to prosper (Casa Rosada 
2011a, translation MNS). 
Later, meeting with then Venezuelan president Chávez in 2011, Kirchner said:  
[…] we want to impose new paradigms, like growth with inclusion, without 
subordination to others, in a multipolar world, in a world that needs to respect 
the diversities and cultural, religious, and political pluralities, without losing 
identity (Casa Rosada 2011b, translation MNS). 
 
24 
 
More recently, after meeting with Putin last July, Kirchner commented on Argentina’s position 
in the G20, where it was one of the few countries not to cold-shoulder Russia: “It is not a matter 
of winners or losers, simply that we firmly believe in multilateralism, in multipolarity […] ” 
(Casa Rosada 2014e, translation MNS). Two weeks later, at the Mercosur summit she claimed: 
“We should not be anxious, but contrarily, double our attempts to construct a more equitable, just 
and multipolar world order […]” (Casa Rosada 2014f, translation MNS). 
 
At a press conference with her Chinese counterpart, Kirchner stated:  
[…] in the face of a bipolar world president Perón, from here, from this place, 
recondite of South America and almost all antipodes of the planet, another 
great leader, president Mao, posed a third position, which is not more or less 
than the right of every people and every society to establish its own forms of 
government, of growth and development without external interference […]. 
[The world] is becoming multipolar […]. (Casa Rosada 2014g, translation 
MNS) 
 
Also this year, Kirchner made numerous references to the Argentine commitment to 
multipolarity. For example, at the Argentine-Chinese business forum, she said:  
And this is what we pretend: to integrate in the world, but to integrate from our 
own interests, from our own model and to articulate with other countries that 
also have the same perception that the world can no longer be unipolar, like it 
was not bipolar and it exploited this bipolarism [sic]. All the countries in the 
world need to accustom to the multipolarity and the appearance of new actors. 
New actors that are modifying the international scene, in which we too feel 
protagonists of this new civilising stage which will demand much 
comprehension from all (Casa Rosada 2015a, translation MNS). 
 
 Last April, Kirchner reiterated her position, during an interview that covered 130 years of 
relations with Russia: 
  Moreover, I believe that we need to accept that a multipolar world of new actors 
has surged. What happens is that there was the perception when the Iron Curtain 
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fell, when the Berlin Wall fell, that history had come to an end. And well, 
history never ends,  history always goes on and changes, and for the best! And it 
changes with new protagonists, new histories and new realities, and I believe 
that Russia is well, an unavoidable actor at global level, at world level, and I do 
not see why we could not have relations with them (Casa Rosada 2015b, 
translation MNS). 
 
Kirchner systematically refers to the emergence of a multipolar world, and Argentina’s support 
for such order. Argentina dismisses the unipolarity that followed the end of the Cold War, and 
feared the return of bipolarity in the Crimea crisis. The Kirchnerist foreign policy is clearly 
multipolarist, in the autonomist tradition that is rooted in the Argentine self-identification of a 
great, and thus autonomous, nation. The multipolarist discourses cited above are only an 
anthology. The list of references to Argentine adherence to multipolarity is long. Kirchner 
declared her support for a multipolar world at various regional and bioregional summits, as the 
OAS, Mercosur, Unasur, G77, the BRICS-Unasur Summit, the EU-Latin America Summit, the 
Africa-South America Summit and the Summit of South American-Arab countries, as well as at 
institutions like the IABD, the Clinton Global Initiative, and the Argentine Institute of Foreign 
Service (Casa Rosada 2009b; 2009c; 2009d; 2009e; 2009f; 2010b; 2010c; 2012; 2014h; 2014i; 
2014j). Kirchner also expressed her multipolarist vision at more political platforms, as the São 
Paolo Forum, her party’s youth organisation, and the rivalling Congress of Popular Radicalism, 
but also at less politicised venues as universities and libraries (ibid. 2009g; 2009h; 2010d; 2014k; 
2015c). Lastly, she addressed multipolarity at economic fora, and at press conferences following 
bilateral meetings with Brazil, Qatar, Russia and Spain - even with the French economist Piketty 
(ibid. 2009i; 2009j; 2011c; 2011d; 2014l; 2015d; 2015e). 
 
Also Brazilian president Rousseff almost ritually incorporates her promotion of multipolarity her 
discourses. Since she took office in 2011, she reiterated her multipolarist vision at press 
conferences following bilateral meetings with partners as diverse as Germany, Sweden, Uruguay, 
the EU, Nigeria, France, Russia, and China (Palácio do Planalto 2011a; 2011b; 2011c; 2011d; 
2013a; 2013b; 2014a; 2015). Also, at various fora, summits, and business seminars as the 
Brazilian Congress, the Rio Branco Institute, Mercosul, the Woodrow Wilson Institute, the 
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World Social Forum, the Brazil-India Business Seminar, the Harvard Kennedy School of 
Governance, the CEO Summit of the Americas, the Clinton Global Initiative, and of course the 
BRICS, Rousseff expressed her commitment to a multipolar world order (ibid. 2011e; 2011f; 
2011g; 2011h; 2012a; 2012b; 2012c; 2012d; 2012e; 2013c; 2013d; 2014b). 
 
With regard to the latter, she claimed:  
“In the countries called BRICS, we fight for a more just, more democratic new 
global economic and political multipolar order. In all global fora, we are in 
favour of multilateralism, of disarmament and of negotiated solutions to all 
threats to global peace” (Palácio do Planalto 2012a, translation MNS).  
Likewise, at one BRICS summit she stated: “We are engaged in the creation of a multipolar 
institutional order, without hegemonic temptations or disputes for areas of influences” (Palácio 
do Planalto 2011i, translation MNS). At the BRICS summit last year, Rousseff stated: 
In today’s meeting, we reiterated the commitment of the BRICS to transparent, 
democratic and efficacious  multilateralism, which heads for a multipolar world. 
We note, however, that the principle institutions of global economic and political 
governance have lost representation and efficacy, that do not reflect the political 
and economic realities of today (Palácio do Planalto 2014b, translation MNS). 
 
In a similar fashion, at a press conference with Venezuelan president Maduro:  
Our countries are demonstrating this vocation to create a common future, that 
unites our entire region, that contributes to a multipolar and multilateral world, 
without spirit of confrontation, without hegemonic pretensions and without 
external interference (Palácio do Planalto: Presidência da República 2013e, 
translation MNS).  
 
Rousseff rejected bipolarity at a meeting with, ironically, then Ukrainian president Yanukovych:  
On issues of peace and security, we [Ukraine and Brazil] agree that the current 
antique structures in a bipolar world lose their efficiency in this new multipolar 
world. Likewise, the United Nations lack reforms like, for example, the reform of 
the UN Security Council (Palácio do Planalto 2011j, translation MNS).  
27 
 
 
A similar statement was made at the Mercosul summit in 2011: 
In the past we had a time, during the Cold War, in which there was bipolarity. 
The discussions were between two concepts of the world and the countries split 
accordingly. Afterwards there was a time in which the world seem to have 
accepted a sole mind-set and the proposal of unipolarity. We now live in another 
historical circumstance and it is very important that people understand, that this 
is multilateralism (Palácio do Planalto 2012g, translation MNS). 
Again, at a press conference with then Egyptian president Morsi, Rousseff said:  
We welcome with satisfaction the determination of your government to 
diversify the relations with developing countries. South-south dialogue and co-
operation are indispensable in the process of the construction of a multipolar 
order, where justice, solidarity, social inclusion and respect for diverse visions 
of the world prevail (Palácio do Planalto 2013f, translation MNS). 
 
Brazil’s statements do not only express multipolarism, but also echo motives that drive 
this endeavour: the Brazilian destination of grandeur, which is confirmed by the unique 
role Brazil spells out for itself in this multipolar world:  
At this very moment, we live in a world of transformation, in a multipolar world 
that is changing, that has changed. First from a bipolar situation to an almost 
unipolar hegemony, but today, one clearly perceives a multipolarisation. In this 
world, Brazil has a special, extremely complex, role (Palácio do Planalto 2012f, 
translation MNS). 
 
Then foreign minister Patriota highlighted this Brazilian exceptionalism, stating:  
The role of promotor of a multipolar cooperative order falls down on Brazil at this 
moment. What I see is that Brazil is uniquely well positioned for the multipolarity of 
cooperation in which the interaction with the primary poles does not represent neglect 
or disrespect for the minor actors in the international scene (Palácio do Planalto 2012h, 
translation MNS). 
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These remarks clarify the connection between identity and multipolarism. Brazil, like Argentina, 
does not want to conform to a world which is dominated by the US, or the US and Russia. 
Convinced of its ‘special role’ and ‘unique position’, a country like Brazil will not acquiesce in a 
role in the shadow of world powers. Doomed to grandeur, both Brazil and Argentina will not 
abide by playing second fiddle, but will assert an autonomous foreign policy that suits their 
standing. Multipolarity has become a key word in this endeavour, and the continuous promotion 
of a multipolar world is to pave the way for their autonomy. Identities are the basis of interests, 
and Brazilian and Argentine identity urge for autonomy,  for which multipolarity offers a fertile 
ground. 
 
In this manner, the investigation of identity as denominator of foreign policy offers an alternative 
perspective on interests. Shifting from material to ideational interests, a constructivist approach 
uncovers the rationality behind the unexpected behaviour of Argentina and Brazil in the case of 
the Crimea crisis. The constructivist focus on ideas, and more specifically the Wendtian 
emphasis on identity as applied in this case, explains the ineptitude of the major theories to 
explain the Argentine and Brazilian position in the Crimea crisis. This case illustrate the role of 
identity in the formation of interests, which is neglected by mainstream IR. Instead of assuming 
exogenous interest, the exploration of endogenous interests offers complementary insight beyond 
the realm of mainstream IR. 
 
Conclusions 
This essay addressed the position of Argentina and Brazil in the Crimea crisis. Contrary to most 
expectations, these countries chose to abstain from voting in the resolution that rejected the 
Russian annexation of Crimea. These expectations are founded in mainstream IR theories, which 
would predict these countries to support the resolution, either because they champion 
international law, or because they boldly side with the partners they share most interests with. 
The problem at the heart with these theories is that they assume state interests as fixed and given. 
The constructivist approach applied here departs from that assumption of exogenous interests 
and examined endogenous factors to explain the positions of Argentina and Brazil. 
 
The notion that interests are also endogenous, and, more specifically, based on identity, provided 
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a point of departure for this query. Brazil and Argentina consider themselves as major players, 
and showcase their identity trough an autonomous foreign policy. This autonomy is expressed by 
the quest for multipolarity, and in the specific case of the Crimea crisis, by means of anti-
bipolarism. Apparently bothered by the dynamic of the conflict, they abstained from voting to 
demonstrate their unwillingness to simply take sides in what increasingly has become another 
proxy conflict between Russia and the West. The dismissal of bipolarity, and the quest for 
multipolarity, is not limited to the Crimea crisis, but is a constant feature in the foreign policies 
of Brasília and Buenos Aires. 
 
Some lessons can be drawn from this tentative conclusion. The US and its allies need to 
recognise that self-declared major third countries do not automatically align with their cause, 
even if they essentially agree. The way this cause is projected, and the manner in which the 
problem and its solutions are addressed, do also count. If the West wants the rest on board, it will 
have to employ a more constructive and less polarising tone. To frame a conflict antagonistically, 
pressuring third countries to merely follow the West, might work for some pro-Western countries, 
but not for countries like Brazil and Argentina who are anxious to be drawn in one camp or 
another. Ironically, one thing is clear: the overarching strategy of the West behind the UN 
resolution – to isolate Russia - has backfired at the US and its allies. 
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